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LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Anne-Marie Slaughter"
Political scientists rediscovered international law in the 1980s, under
the rubric of regime theory.' International lawyers accepted this rein-
statement of their discipline (from the perspective of political science, of
course) with tolerable, if bemused, good grace, and set about collaborat-
ing on joint studies of environmental regimes, trade regimes, and the
general subject of regime management and compliance. The world coop-
erated, holding out new vistas of international cooperation and law-mak-
ing.
By the mid-1990s, the world is a harsher place. The horrors of the
Bosnian war continue to unfold, lending a pointed edge to Henry
Kissinger's reminder of the rationale for Realpolitik. Newly heightened
expectations of the United Nations now often serve principally to gauge
the depths of its failure. Is the stage then set for a new divergence of
the disciplines? Will regime theory give way to a new wave of Real-
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1. See Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 186 (1982) (defining regimes as "sets
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.").
Krasner defines 'principles' as beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Id. 'Norms' are
defined as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Id.
'Rules' are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Id; see also, ORAN R.
YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAM REsoUcREs
ANm THE ENvioN MENT (1989).
2. See generally HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY (1994).
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ism? Or perhaps the traditional split between high and low politics will
widen, leaving the diplomats and warriors on one side and the econo-
mists and international lawyers on the other.
This essay argues that regardless of the currents of the times, interna-
tional relations theory can make an enduring contribution to international
law. The three principal schools of international relations theo-
ry-Realism, Institutionalism, and Liberalism 3 -all shed light on the
assumptions underpinning different visions of international law, and all
have implications for the efficacy of specific international rules. The
relevance of international relations theory does not depend on the inter-
national relations theorists' view of international law. It flows rather
from the fact that international lawyers and international relations schol-
ars study and thus must conceptualize the same phenomenon-the be-
havior of the principal actors in the international system. They ask dif-
ferent questions and seek different answers of that system. At some
point, however, their understanding of what they are observing must
overlap.
Part I spells out some of the precise links between international rela-
tions theory and international law. Part II offers a brief overview of
Realism, Institutionalism, and Liberalism. Part II also discusses how
conceptions of international law linked to these distinctive schools differ.
Part III uses the broad assumptions of Liberal international relations
theory to critique current United States doctrine on extraterritorial appli-
cation of United States laws and proposes an alternative doctrinal ap-
proach. The application of Liberal theory in this manner, and the con-
clusions drawn from its application, suggest that this branch of intema-
tional relations theory is particularly congruent with the self-conception
of international economic law.
I. HOW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY CAN
CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Scholars of international relations, a sub-discipline of political science,
generate a wide range of theories to solve the problems and puzzles of
state behavior.4 Each theory offers a causal account of a particular out-
come or pattern of behavior in inter-state relations in a form that iso-
3. See infra Part II., Sections A-C (respectively discussing Realism, Institutional-
ism and Liberalism).
4. See, e.g., KENNETH WALTz, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLrTICS 1 (1979)
(discussing several theories on state behavior).
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lates independent and dependent variables that are sufficiently precise to
generate hypotheses (predictions) that can be empirically tested.5 At a
higher level of generality, these theories can be grouped into different
families or approaches. This grouping is based upon their underlying
analytical assumptions about the nature of states and the relative explan-
atory power of broad classes of causal factors, such as the distribution
of power in the international system, international institutions, national
ideology and domestic political structure.
This essay will summarize the three main theoretical approaches used
in contemporary American political science.6 Political scientists would
find the versions presented here overly simplified and distilled. Yet each
approach gives rise to a distinct mental map of the international system,
specifying the principal actors within it, the forces driving or motivating
those actors, and the constraints imposed on those actors by the nature
of the system itself. Anyone who thinks about foreign policy or interna-
tional relations, from either a political or a legal standpoint, must have
some such map to guide her thinking, whether consciously or subcon-
sciously.
Beyond mental geography, however, the explicit role of theory differs
for political scientists and lawyers. For political scientists, the purpose of
uncovering this map and explicating its underlying assumptions is to test
the positive validity of those assumptions. Do states in fact behave as
they are assumed to? Does the mental map correspond to what we ac-
tually see, or think we see? Does it permit accurate diagnosis of interna-
tional problems and generate valid predictions and prescriptions for their
resolution? Clarity about underlying premises is an indispensable founda-
tion for accurate positive explanation.
For lawyers, the significance of underlying positive assumptions about
the way the world works may be less immediately apparent, but no less
important. Assume an instrumental view of international law, in which
law-makers and commentators design legal rules to achieve specific ends
based on positive reasoning about how those ends may be achieved.
This is neither the only or even the best perspective on the discipline
and practice of international law; many might prefer a deontological
quest for norms of international justice. Even from this perspective,
however, part of the international lawyer's task will be to determine
how these norms are most effectively implemented. Thus at some stage,
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II, Sections A-C (discussing the three major theoretical ap-
proaches used in political science).
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excavating and challenging assumptions about the nature and form of
the international system emerges as an essential component of legal
analysis, an effort to understand the realm of the possible and to expand
the realm of the probable.
To illustrate, imagine a set of agreed exogenous goals, such as peace,
increasing international cooperation, resolving international conflict,
preserving common resources, or advancing global prosperity. Altering
positive assumptions about who the principal actors are in the interna-
tional system and about the motives that drive them gives rise to differ-
ent causal statements about the source of particular problems. These
differing analyses will in turn suggest different political and legal strate-
gies as to how to resolve those problems in the service of the posited
affirmative goals.
The most prominent example of this type of reasoning is the differen-
tial diagnosis of the sources of war. an imbalance of power in the inter-
national system, misinformation and uncertainty, or inadequate represen-
tation of the individuals and groups most directly affected by war in the
decision to go to war. The first diagnosis gives rise to legal norms
seeking to restrict or constrain state use of power. The second would
suggest the creation of international institutions to facilitate communica-
tion and confidence-building measures among potentially warring parties.
The third would generate both rules and possibly institutions designed to
expand political representation at the domestic level.
An equally important example concerns competing diagnoses of trade
conflicts. Here again, the problem can be identified as a fundamental
and inevitable conflict between states competing to gain relative advan-
tage over one another, a problem of institutional design affecting the
ability of states to coordinate and cooperate to reach an optimal solu-
tion; or the misrepresentation of underlying individual and group inter-
ests such that conflicting state positions reflect the capture of domestic
political processes by special interests. Each of these diagnoses would
give rise to different political strategies and corresponding legal regimes:
the facilitation of trade alliances to neutralize competition; an interna-
tional regime designed to overcome coordination and information prob-
lems (e.g., the GATT); or strategies allowing domestic litigants to in-
voke international rules against domestic interest groups in court. This
last strategy does not exclude an international institutional framework,
but it would be intermeshed with domestic politics and law.
Some international lawyers might conclude that these differential diag-
noses are the preliminary steps that must be taken to determine what
category of law is appropriate to the solution of a particular policy
[VOL. 10:2720
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problem-international or domestic. On this view, competing paradigms
of international relations theory thus serve above all to delimit the
boundaries of disciplinary jurisdiction. It is perhaps preferable, however,
to define international lawyering as seeking legal solutions to interna-
tional problems, regardless of the labels attached to any particular body
of law. From this perspective, international relations theory is an impor-
tant part of any international lawyer's toolkit.
Others will argue that this approach attempts to attach political sci-
ence labels to concepts and modes of analysis in which international
lawyers already engage, but without fanfare. There is some merit in this
claim, particularly with regard to the overlap between much of tradition-
al international law and what political scientists call regime theory. As
demonstrated in the following section, however, explicating the connec-
tions between the two disciplines may make international lawyers more
aware of the extent to which deeply entrenched international legal rules
and principles reflect outmoded or discredited assumptions about the
international system. It may also encourage them to follow the lead of a
branch of international relations theory-Liberalism---that challenges
some of the most fundamental norms of the current system.
II. PRINCIPAL PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY
Each of the following subsections will present the principal assump-
tions of the school of scholarship under consideration and examine ways
in which current and historical international legal rules reflect reliance
on these assumptions.
A. REALISM
The dominant approach in international relations theory for virtually
the past two millennia, from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Morgenthau,
7. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87
AM. J. INT'L. L. 205, 220-22 (1993) (hereinafter Slaughter Burley, International Lm]
(outlining the contributions of regime theorists and international lawyers to the study
of international norms and institutions); Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, The-
ories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491, 491-92 (1987) (discussing the
divergence between the views of political scientists and those of international lawyers
vis-A-vis state behavior).
8. See infra Part II, Section C.
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has been Realism, also known as Political Realism.' Realists come in
many forms, but all generally share the following assumptions about
international relations. First, they believe that states are the primary
actors in the international system, rational unitary actors who are func-
tionally identical.'0 Second, they assume that the organizing principle of
the international system is anarchy, which cannot be mediated by inter-
national institutions." Without a central authority, power determines the
outcomes of state interactions. Third, states can be treated as if their
dominant preference were for power.'
2
Realists can admit the possibility of a wide range of state preferences,
conditioned by factors such as geography, culture, and ideology. 3 They
argue, however, that states must secure power as the means to achieve
those ends. Neorealists, also known as structural realists, ' argue further
that the anarchic structure of the international system makes power a
prerequisite for survival. The absence of a central coercive authority cre-
ates such a high degree of actual or potential conflict that states must at
the very least acquire enough power to defend themselves. 5
Although Realism is probably best known among international lawyers
for rejecting any role for international legal norms in the international
system, other than the short-term service of state interests, much of both
the structure and substance of traditional international law appears to be
built on a Realist foundation. 6 Realists and traditional international
lawyers overlap on three core assumptions concerning actors, preferenc-
es, and the constraints imposed by the international system." They ulti-
mately diverge with international lawyers seeking to blunt or alter the
9. WALTZ, supra note 4, at 117.
10. Id. at 104.
11. Id.
12. David Grann, Kennan at 90: Still in Search of Mr. X, V FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 151, 151 (1994).
13. See David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994
UTAH L. REv. 7, 11 (1994)
14. See JOSEPH M. GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA
AND NON-TARiFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (1990) (noting that both neorealists and struc-
tural realists believe that international cooperation is governed by mutual rivalries and
the distribution of power).
15. WALTZ, supra note 4, at 102.
16. See Slaughter Burley, International Law, supra note 7, at 205.
17. See generally Bardo Fassbender, International Law and International Relations
Theory: Building Bridges, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 167 (1992) (symposium
discussing the interface between international law and international relations).
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implications of a pure Realist analysis, but less than either camp might
suspect.
The clearest overlap concerns the relevant criteria for identifying
participants in the international system. Both Realists and traditional
international lawyers agree that the primary actors are states, and define
states as monolithic units identifiable only by the functional characteris-
tics that constitute them as states. Neither would take account of domes-
tic political ideology or structure, or of the multiplicity of sub-state
actors that determine state policy at the domestic level." Both would
assume that rules governing state behavior apply to all states qua states,
without regard to their internal identity. The first-order international
legal principles of sovereign equality and exclusive domestic jurisdiction
are safeguards of the identity and opacity of the sovereign sphere. Inter-
national legal rules governing recognition and state succession similarly
ensure a complete divorce between governments and states.
For post-Westphalian international lawyers, then, states are both the
source and the subject of rules governing international relations. What
motivates and constrains these states in their relations with one another?
As will be discussed with regard to Institutionalism,"9 most internation-
al lawyers assume that states have at least some common ends and that
they can arrange to achieve them by means other than power. Neverthe-
less, many aspects of traditional international law tacitly acknowledge
the extent to which international relations are power relations.
To take only one example, consider the centrality of the territoriality
principle in both international law and politics. For Realists, territorial
boundaries define the area from which resources necessary for military
and economic power can be extracted, thereby circumscribing the extent
of state power. It is this notion of territorially defined power that under-
pins Arnold Wolfers' classic Realist image of states as billiard balls:
opaque, hard, clearly defined spheres colliding with one another!' The
circumference of each sphere is defined by territory. For international
lawyers, control over a defined territory is the first criterion of
statehood, an indispensable prerequisite for participation in the interna-
18. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism
and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907, 1907 (1992) (noting that
the use of distinctions between different categories of sovereign states as a basis for
legal analysis is taboo in traditional international law).
19. See infra Part II., Section B.
20. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
21. See generally ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL POLMTICS (1962).
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tional system. It thus appears that the ante for participation in the inter-
national game is the capacity to wield power.
More generally, consider the many international lawyers who have
sought to reconcile their discipline with the primacy of state power in
the international system. The great positivists were all steeped in this
tradition. Michael Reisman has just reminded us of Oppenheimer's real-
ism, his uncompromising recognition of the limits set by the balance of
power.22 David Kennedy has similarly depicted Hans Kelsen as the pro-
genitor of a line of international law scholars who "hoped to remain
realistic about state power without becoming political scientists," who
embraced "formalism and respect for sovereignty" as a realistic recogni-
tion of the limits of law and the persistence of power.2" More sweep-
ingly, Martti Koskenniemi dichotomizes all of international legal argu-
mentation into a debate between the apologists and the utopians 24-
those who accept that international law reflects whatever states do and
those who would have international law transcend and constrain state
behavior. The apologists are Realists.
B. INSTITUTIONALISM"
To the extent that Institutionalism reflects the belief that "rules,
norms, principles and decision-making procedures" can mitigate the
effects of anarchy and allow states to cooperate in the pursuit of com-
22. W. Michael Reisman, Lassa Oppenheim's Nine Lives, 19 YALE J. INT'L L.
255 (1994) (reviewing S.R. JENNINGS and S.A. WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1992)).
23. Kennedy, supra note 13, at 36.
24. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUcTURE OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
25. Institutionalism as I refer to it here is frequently referred to among interna-
tional relations scholars as Neoliberal, Instititutionalism, following Robert Keohane,
who coined the term. See Robert Keohane, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE
POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATION THEORY vii (1989). For those seeking
to find their way through the bewildering maze of theoretical labels, the introductory
essay to this volume offers a useful overview of the distinctions between Neoliberal
Institutionalism, Neorealism, and Liberalism. Id. at 7-16. Keohane's summation of the
Liberal tradition, however, differs considerably from the Liberal paradigm described in
this essay. His version of Liberalism is instead heavily tilted toward the role of insti-
tutions in international politics. Id. at 9. It "accept[s] a version of liberal principles
that . . . emphasize[] the pervasive significance of international institutions without
denigrating the role of state power." Id. at 11. Cf. Fassbender, supra note 17, at 176
(emphasizing the importance of a state's self-interest in choosing whether to respect
international commitments and institutions).
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mon ends, all international lawyers are Institutionalists. "Rules, norms,
principles and decision-making procedures" define an international re-
gime, the much studied phenomenon that reintroduced international law
to political scientists in the 1980s.0 According to Robert Keohane's
influential account in After Hegemony, because international regimes
reduce transaction costs consistent with principles of the regime, regimes
promote cooperation between and among states. ' They "create the con-
ditions for orderly multilateral negotiations, legitimate and delegitimate
different types of state action, and facilitate linkages among issues with-
in regimes and between regimes." Moreover, they enhance the quality
of the information that governments receive.
International regimes also enhance compliance with international
agreements in a variety of ways. They reduce incentives to cheat, en-
hance the value of reputation, establish "legitimate standards of behavior
for states to follow," and facilitate monitoring. In this way they create
"the basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the principle of
reciprocity."
This "functionalist," or, as it would later come to be known, "ratio-
nalist" view of regimes has provided a tool for the study of international
cooperation that extends beyond the traditional "low politics" of interna-
tional political economy, long thought a more fertile area for cooperative
action than the "high politics" of security studies, where most Realists
were concentrated?' As a group of international political economists
and security scholars subsequently demonstrated, the approach was
equally applicable to explaining cooperation under conditions of con-
flict
?2
In its fully developed form, Institutionalism offers an alternative para-
digm to Realism, albeit a related one. Institutionalists begin by recogniz-
ing "the fact that world politics at any given time is to some extent
26. See supra note I and accompanying text.
27. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEiONY: COOPERATION AND DIScORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 244 (1984).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 244-45.
31. See generally Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, International
Organization: a State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753, 762
(1986).
32. See, e.g., Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 173
(Stephen Krasner ed., 1983); KENNETH A. OYE, COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY
(1986).
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institutionalized, both through [f]ormal international organizations and
codified rules and norms" and through less formalized patterns of behav-
ior "recognized by participants as reflecting established rules, norms, and
conventions." '33 Further, "conventions in world politics are as fundamen-
tal as the distribution of capabilities among states."34
Here, then, is the divergence from Realism. Whereas Institutionalists
would agree that states are the primary actors in the international system
and that, absent institutions, states are engaged in the pursuit of power,
they would contend that the presence of institutions modifies the orga-
nizing principle of anarchy.35 The uncertainty and ever-present possibili-
ty of conflict that leads states in a Realist world to expect and prepare
for the worst is diffused by the information provided by and through
institutions. These institutions must thus be factored into systemic ex-
planations of state behavior independently of structure. Further, having
ameliorated the conditions of conflict that force states to concentrate on
the quest for power, institutions can facilitate the achievement of com-
mon ends.
In large degree the debate between Realists and Institutionalists reca-
pitulates the ancient debate between Hobbes and Grotius. 3Y Not surpris-
ingly, international lawyers typically side with Grotius. If they did not
believe that international institutions could modify state behavior and in
turn bring common goals within reach, they could not justify their own
existence." In the process, however, international lawyers, similar to
Institutionalists, continue to accept a largely Realist foundation and
framework as the point of departure for conceptualizing the international
system.
To take one example, the United Nations Charter is an Institutionalist
response to the fact of state power. Whereas Realists design political
strategies to answer power with power, international lawyers search for
rules to define and thus to restrain legitimate and illegitimate uses of
33. Keohane, supra note 25, at vii.
34. Id. at 8.
35. See Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 31, at 756-57 (noting the role of in-
temational institutions in securing peace and security through efforts in North-South
relations, nuclear safeguarding and preventive diplomacy).
36. KEOHANE, supra note 27, at 245 (arguing that realism should be reformulated
to reflect the impact of information-providing institutions on state behavior).
37. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (1977) (discussing
the influence of Grotius and Hobbes on international relations theory).
38. In this context, the term 'institution' should be understood to include all in-
ternational legal rules and doctrines, as well as formal international organizations.
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power. Norms of sovereign identity and equality seek to create a fic-
tional world in which power is equalized; prohibitions on the use of
force seek to shape reality to approximate this fiction. The United Na-
tions Charter neatly blends both political and legal approaches, combin-
ing an absolute prohibition on the use of force in Art. 2(4) with a
mechanism for the concentration of power by a designated group of
powerful states against a transgressor against international peaceJ
C. LIBERALISM
The principal alternative to Realism and Institutionalism among inter-
national relations theorists is Liberalism.' As in the domestic realm,
Liberal international relations theories are frequently characterized as
normative rather than positive theories.4' The best known Liberal theory
in this category is Wilsonian "liberal internationalism," popularly under-
stood as a program for world democracy.' As used here, however,
Liberalism denotes a family of positive theories about how states do
behave rather than how they should behave.
Efforts to reduce Liberalism to a set of positive assumptions that can
be stated as succinctly as their Realist counterparts are ongoing among a
growing group of contemporary political scientists."3 The discussion
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
40. I use "Liberalism" here and throughout this paper as a term of art to refer
to Liberal international relations theory. As Andrew Moravcsik has argued, the ele-
ments of this theory flow from the political theory and philosophy that we call "liber-
alism." See Andrew M. Moravesik, Liberalism and International Relations Theory,
Center for International Affairs Working Paper, (Harvard University (1992)). This
transposition of liberal analytical assumptions from the domestic context to the inter-
national realm is complicated. For present purposes it makes more sense to try to
understand Liberal international relations theory on its own terms as a self-contained
alternative to Realism.
41. Id.
42. See Slaughter Burley, International Law, supra note 7, at 208. (Realists
viewed Wilson as the founder of the "legal-moralist" tradition in foreign policy).
43. See, e.g., Daniel Deudney, Binding Powers, Bound States: The Logic and
Geopolitics of Negarchy, Paper presented at the International Studies Association,
(Washington, D.C.; March 28-April 2, 1994); Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Mat-
thew, Liberal International Theory- Common Threads, Divergent Strands, Paper pre-
sented at American Political Science Association, (Chicago, IL; Sept. 3-6 1992); Rob-
ert 0. Keohane, International Liberalism Reconsidered, in TE ECONOMIC LIMTrS TO
MODERN POLrICS 155 (J. Dunn, ed., 1990); Joseph S. Nye, Neorealism and
Neoliberalism, 40 WORLD PoLIICS 235 (1988).
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here draws primarily on one particular version developed by Andrew
Moravcsik." Where Realists view states as "opaque single units," Lib-
erals begin with individuals and groups operating in both domestic and
transnational civil society.45 These are the primary actors in the interna-
tional system. State behavior is in turn determined not by the interna-
tional balance of power, whether or not mediated by institutions, but by
the relationship between these social actors and the governments repre-
senting their interests, in varying degrees of completeness.' State pref-
erences are derivative of individual and groups preferences, but depend
crucially on which individuals and groups are represented.47 Finally, the
outcome of state interactions is a function, at least in the first instance,
not of relative power capabilities, but of the configuration and intensity
of state preferences.'
To dichotomize Realism and Liberalism in more concrete terms,
where Realists look for concentrations of state power, Liberals focus on
the ways in which interdependence encourages and allows individuals
and groups to exert different pressures on national governments.49
Where Realists assume "autonomous" national decision-makers, Liberals
examine the "nature of domestic representation . . . [as] the decisive
link between societal demands and state policy."5 Where Realists mod-
el patterns of strategic interaction based on fixed state preferences, Lib-
erals seek first to establish the nature and strength of those preferences
as a function of the interests and purposes of domestic and transnational
actors."
There is some debate about the nature of this project. Zacher and Matthew, for
instance, argue that Liberalism's propositions cannot be simply deduced from its as-
sumptions. Moravcsik, however, undertakes to identify core Liberal assumptions that
will permit precisely such deduction or hypotheses.
44. Moravcsik, supra note 40, at 6.
45. See Slaughter Burley, International Law, supra note 7, at 227-28 (explaining
the core assumptions of liberal theory).
46. Moravcsik, supra note 40, at 6.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 10.
49. The phenomenon of "interdependence,"-defined as a situation in which two
or more nations each depend on the other, whether symmetrically or not, by virtue of
trade and investment patterns, population flows, or even cultural and other social ex-
changes--can be analyzed from either a Realist or a Liberal perspective. Realists
focus only on the impact of interdependence on the power differential between the
nations concerned, whereas Liberals analyze it as an international social phenomenon.
50. Moravcsik, supra note 40, at 11.
51. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 7, at 228.
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An international legal system seeking to accomplish instrumental goals
such as the reduction of conflict and the increase of cooperation through
laws grounded on Liberal assumptions looks very different from tradi-
tional international law. To begin with, it assumes that the primary
source of conflict among states is not the struggle for power, but rather
than conflict of state interests. Further, it assumes that these interests
vary from state to state as a function of the preferences of individuals
and groups operating in society; of the distribution of different prefer-
ences within a particular society; and of the degree to which a particular
government is representative of individuals and groups in its own soci-
ety and in transnational society.
Based on these assumptions, the best way to resolve conflict and to
promote cooperation in the service of common ends is to find ways to
align these underlying state interests, either by changing individual and
group preferences or by ensuring that they are accurately represented. In
the military context, prescriptive Liberal international relations theories
thus seek to ensure that all sectors of a given society that are likely to
be directly affected by a war are represented in the decision to go to
war. In the economic context, Liberal international relations theorists
seek to avoid trade wars by ensuring that special interest groups with
trading interests that are not representative of the population as a whole
do not capture the decision-making process.
Second, a Liberal conception of international law focuses on states as
the agents of individual and group interests? This means that the law
designed to achieve specific international outcomes does not have states
as its subjects, but rather the individuals and groups that states are as-
sumed to represent.53 It does not mean, however, that international legal
rules and institutions would no longer have states as subjects. Traditional
international law, after all, imposes a duty of domestic implementation,
requiring states to make whatever domestic legal changes are necessary
52. Id.
53. Note that the concept of state representation of individual and group interests
need not imply fair, equal, or accurate representation. For example, a military dictator-
ship may represent the interests of only a very small portion of the state's population;
nevertheless, it represents a particular "interest." A Liberal theory of international law
need not accept this state of affairs; indeed, Fernando Teson has pioneered a set of
normative prescriptions that link state legitimacy exclusively to the nature and extent
of representation of domestic interest. He derives these prescriptions, and the accom-
panying normative framework, from his reading of a Kantian theory of international
law, the source for may Liberal international relations theorists. Fernando Teson, The
Kantian Theory of International Law," 92 COLutM. L. REV. 53, 53 (1992).
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to conform with its international obligation. 4 The decision whether to
achieve a particular policy solution by laws binding on states alone or
by laws and institutions aimed directly at individuals and groups would
depend on an empirical determination as to which strategy would be
more effective in altering either the behavior of individual and groups as
represented by states, or the mode and scope of state representation.
A conception of international law informed by international relations
theory thus subsumes most of what is now defined as private interna-
tional law or conflicts of law. The choice of law governing individuals
and groups in transnational society is an important factor shaping the
predictability and facility of transnational social relations. It would also
include many elements of what is currently defined as public interna-
tional law, focusing on treaties and customary international law that can
be brought directly to bear on individuals and groups in domestic and
transnational society.
Turning from structure and sources to substance, a Liberal conception
of international law focuses on state interests rather than state power.55
It conceptualizes threats to international order, or obstacles to interna-
tional cooperation, in terms of conflicts of state interests. The law de-
signed to combat such threats would accordingly focus on ways to re-
solve these conflicts: by distinguishing "true conflicts" from false
ones, 6 by establishing principles of deference, 7 or by identifying and
classifying common interests that might serve as the basis for
harmonization. This focus on interests rather than power in turn shifts
54. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (3d ed.
1979) ("Arising from the nature of treaty obligations and from customary international
law, there is a general duty to bring internal law into conformity with obligations
under international law.").
55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing the outcome of state
interactions as a result of state preferences rather than of relative power capabilities).
56. See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 179, 211-13 (1991) (describing a false conflict as one
where conduct occurring in the United States creates no interest in applying American
law, or where conduct occurring abroad creates no interest in applying the foreign
law). Professor Kramer further argues that if a court applies domestic law during a
false conflict, it would needlessly subordinate and interfere with the law and policy of
the other nation. Id.
57. See id. at 213-15 (arguing that a nation should apply its laws extraterritorially
when this advances the policies that led the legislature to pass a law for wholly do-
mestic cases).
58. See id. at 220-21 (noting that the best way to resolve "true conflicts" is thus
to determine which type of cases nations care about most, and subsequently arrange
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attention from territory (or other sources of state power) to the modes
and accuracy of representation of social interests. Finally, emphasizing
representative structures permits the differentiation of different categories
of states based on domestic regime-type, such as drawing a distinction
between "liberal" and "non-liberal" states.59 Such a distinction may not
be necessary, however, with regard to many areas of the law.
The actual international system naturally contains Realist, Institutional-
ist, and Liberal elements. State behavior is the product of a complex
web of factors. The above analysis is thus inevitably artificial. It can
nevertheless be justified on heuristic grounds; it is important for political
scientists and lawyers to be able to distinguish the three strands and to
understand their differential implications before weaving them together.
In this spirit, Part II will present a purely Liberal approach to the ex-
traterritoriality doctrine in United States law.
Ill. FROM POWER TO INTERESTS: REVERSING THE
PRESUMPTION OF TERRITORIALITY
The doctrine of extraterritoriality regulates the question of when a
nation may apply its laws to individuals or conduct outside its physical
.territory.' It is a subset of the broader question of legislative jurisdic-
tion-the geographical scope of a lawmaking body's power to regu-
late.6"' Ideally, all nations should be able to regulate a core zone or
range of individuals and conduct of concern to them without undue
friction with other nations. An instrumental view of extraterritoriality
trade-offs that secure the application of each nation's law in as many of these as
possible). This would, in effect, allow each nation to achieve its objectives or prefer-
ences. Id. at 221.
59. A subset of Liberal international relations theory focuses on the relations
among "liberal states," defined as states with some form of representative government,
a market economy based on property rights, juridical equality, and constitutional
protections of basic civil and political rights. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 230 (1983). The most
publicized aspect of this theory has been empirical evidence of the "democratic
peace'--evidence that liberal states are far less likely to go to war with one another
than they are with nonliberal states. See BRUCE RussErr, GRASPING THE DEb.ocRATc
PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR VORLD (1993). In other work I have
sought to extend this theory to build a model of legal relations among liberal states.
See Burley, supra note 18 at 1907.
60. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
61. See Restatement (Third) of American Foreign Relations Law § 402 (setting
forth the bases of a state's jurisdiction to make law).
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doctrine would design a doctrine to achieve this goal. A Liberal analysis
of the underlying problem would focus on reconciling the social and
economic interests represented by the states involved in a particular con-
flict over extraterritoriality.' After briefly reviewing the trajectory of
U.S. caselaw in this area since 1945, this section applies these principles
to critique existing doctrine and offer a potential alternative.
Since 1945, U.S. doctrines of extraterritoriality have varied depending
on the nature of the statute, but have all expanded considerably. The
point of departure for this expansion was the pioneering of the "effects
doctrine." As stated in its originil formulation by Judge Learned Hand,
the effects doctrine permitted the application of U.S. legislation in any
case in which foreign conduct was intended to and did in fact have "an
effect on U.S. commerce."'63 At its high point, the effects doctrine per-
mitted the application of U.S. antitrust laws to an alleged conspiracy in
restraint of trade between a Japanese parent company and its U.S. sub-
sidiary operating in Indonesia with regard to an agreement to ship logs
to Japan.'
Various circuit courts tempered the effects doctrine by adopting ver-
sions of a jurisdictional "rule of reason," ultimately enshrined in the
Third Restatement of American Foreign Relations Law.s The test for
62. See Kramer, supra note 56, at 221-222 (noting that an alternative to the tra-
ditional territoriality doctrine would be for states to identify generally shared policies
or preferences and construct rules that systematically advance these preferences).
63. United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
64. Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g
denied, 677 F.2d 113, vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), on remand, 704
F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied 709 F.2d 712, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961
(1983), appeal after remand, 855 F.2d 222 (5th. Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 860 F.2d
437 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
65. See Timberlane v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th. Cir. 1976) (Subject
matter jurisdiction is not present unless the alleged illegal act was intended to affect
U.S. concerns; the alleged act was of such a type and magnitude so as to be cogni-
zable as a violation of U.S. laws; and whether, after considering issues of internation-
al comity and fairness, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. should be asserted
to cover the act); Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d.
Cir. 1979); see also KINGMAN BREWSTER, Antitrust and American Business Abroad
(1958) (formulating an early version of the "rule of reason" approach").
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrIED
STATES sec. 403(h) (1994) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Factors to use in the
test include:"(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e.,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as
nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the per-
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extraterritorial application of a particular statute thus evolved into a two-
prong test. Under the first prong, the court canvasses the evidence in
support of one of several bases of jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality,
and effects being the most frequent.67 Before deciding whether jurisdic-
tion in fact exists, however, a court is to conduct a reasonableness anal-
ysis, which essentially involves balancing the interests of the two states
involved with regard to the activity under consideration.'
If the rule of reason was designed to moderate the overly aggressive
assertion of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court took a
much more drastic step in this direction in 1991. In EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), ° a case in which the Court was asked to ex-
tend Title VII to the activities of an American corporation that had
allegedly discriminated against an American citizen dismissed from em-
ployment in Saudi Arabia, the Court reestablished a strong "presumption
of territoriality" in determining whether to give U.S. legislation extrater-
ritorial effect.7' The presumption may only be overcome by a "clear
son principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the regulation is designed to protect;, (c) the character of the activity to
be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which
other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might
be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the
international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regula-
tion is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to
which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; (h) the likelihood
of conflict with regulation by another state." Id.
67. See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Products v. Canadian Forest Products, 810 F.Supp.
1116, 1118 (D.C. Colo. 1993) (addressing whether plaintiff made a showing of a
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on import, commerce, or trade be-
fore conducting a reasonableness analysis); Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. North
Am. Petrol., 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding jurisdiction
based on the direct, significant and foreseeable effect defendant's conduct allegedly
had on U.S. commerce).
68. The Restatement approach conducts the reasonableness inquiry as part of the
jurisdictional analysis itself. Supra note 66 and accompanying text. The test adopted
by various circuits, on the other hand instead, uses the test as a discretionary inquiry
to determine whether jurisdiction, once established, should be exercised. See cases
cited supra note 66.
69. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Inter-
section Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L 280 (1982)
(documenting foreign protest of U.S. assertions of jurisdiction over conduct by foreign
corporations).
70. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
71. Id. at 248-58.
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statement" of Congressional intent to apply the statute in question be-
yond U.S. borders.72
The Aramco decision generated widespread criticism, and was ulti-
mately overturned by Congress with respect to the specific provision of
Title VII in question.73 The broader presumption of territoriality, how-
ever, remained in place.74 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Califor-
nia," the Court upheld the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws.76 The Court also fragmented in ways that suggested that its over-
all approach to extraterritoriality continues to evolve." The majority
relied on the effects doctrine, without the tempering effects of the rule
of reason.78 The four dissenters, on the other hand, including many of
the same Justices who had sided with the majority in Aramco,79 essen-
72. Id. at 248. But see Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67 (2d.
Cir. 1994) (noting that while the Aramco dissent and some commentators interpret
Aramco as establishing a "clear statement" rule, the Supreme Court has made clear
that references to non-textual sources is permissible).
73. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000(e) (Supp. V 1993) (adding: "[w]ith respect to employ-
ment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the
United States); see Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir.
1992) (noting that Aramco is specifically overruled by 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)).
74. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2567 (1993) (reiterating that
acts of Congress ordinarily do not have extraterritorial application unless such intent
is clearly manifested).
75. 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
76. Id. at 2909 (holding that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that is
meant to produce and does in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States).
77. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
78. Justice Souter, writing for the five-to-four majority, held that "it is well es-
tablished by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States." Hart-
ford Fire, 113 S.Ct. 2909. Moreover, the majority affirmed the court of appeals' deci-
sion that the district court should not have declined to exercise jurisdiction by reason
of the principle of international comity. "International comity would not counsel
against exercising jurisdiction." Id. at 2910. The Court noted that the only "substantial
question" was whether "there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign
law." See id. (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)). Notwithstanding the amicus brief of the
British Government and the defendant's contention that the United Kingdom had es-
tablished a comprehensive regulatory regime over the London reinsurance market, the
Court found no conflict "where a person subject to regulation by two states can com-
ply with the laws of both." See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES sec. 403 comment (e) (1987)).
79. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in which Justices White,
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tially adopted the Restatement's analysis in any case in which the initial
presumption of territoriality could be overcome' (in this case by the
weight of accumulated precedent applying the Sherman Act
extraterritorially).,'
To a Liberal international relations theorist, the Court's trajectory
from 1945 until Aramco is striking precisely because it suggests a shift
from a focus on power to a focus on interests. The starting point is
Justice Holmes' 1909 dictum in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co:82 "[tihe general and almost universal rule is that the character of
an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of
the country where the act is done."83 This dictum reflected a world of
strictly bounded national territories, in which legislative power was co-
extensive with physical power over a defined territory. Alcoa was a
legal extension of this territorial zone through the equation of activity
having an effect on national territory with activity happening on that
territory. The rule of reason, by contrast, explicitly introduces interest
calculations, seeking to condition the determination of jurisdiction on a
determination of which state has a greater interest in regulating the
conduct in question. From a Liberal perspective, this focus on interests
is likely to be more fruitful than a straightforward assertion of power at
resolving the underlying conflict.
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter joined. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 244. Justice White con-
cured in this opinion.
80. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas. dissented
from the majority on the significance of comity. Scalia noted that "the practice of
using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly estab-
lished" and explained that he had relied on the RESTATEENT (THMRD) for the rele-
vant international law. Hartford Fire, 113 S.Ct. at 2920. The dissent noted that,
though the U.S. undoubtedly had legislative jurisdiction over the action, "under the
Restatement, a nation having some basis for jurisdiction to prescribe law should none-
theless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unrea-
sonable." Id. at 2921.
81. The best explanation for this outcome may be that some Justices in the ma-
jority were in fact prepared to temper their holding in Aramco to restore the rule of
reason, but would have applied the reasonableness analysis on the facts of this case
to find jurisdiction. This prevented them from voting with the dissent, notwithstanding
agreement on the appropriate test, because the dissent applied the reasonableness anal-
ysis to find against jurisdiction. Respondents' "admission" of jurisdiction may thus
have helped forge a narrow coalition.
82. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
83. Id. at 356.
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A Liberal analysis would further argue that the return to the presump-
tion of territoriality makes no sense, unless a convincing case can be
made that a nation's interests are in fact limited to its territory or that
such a limitation is most likely to reduce the prospect of conflict with
foreign nations. The Aramco case itself challenges both propositions.
First, the United States clearly has an interest in the conduct of
corporations regarding U.S. nationals. That time and technology have
combined to make it increasingly likely that such conduct may take
place outside the territory of the United States does not diminish this
interest. Second, it is not clear that Saudi Arabia has a particularly
strong interest in the conduct of United States corporations regarding
United States nationals on its territory, at least where such conduct
would not generate clear externalities such as potential disturbances of
the peace or violations of Saudi law.
Thus far, the application of Liberal international relations theory
yields little more than a concurrence with mainstream criticism of
Aramco. Many commentators denounced the renewed presumption of
territoriality as a giant step backwards to a rigid and out-moded princi-
ple that would handicap U.S law-enforcement efforts in an era of instant
communication and webs of multinational ownership.84 A Liberal analy-
sis would go considerably further, however, in its criticism of the rule
of reason, on several grounds.
First, the rule of reason remains closely tied to territory, and with it,
to lurking notions of physical power. The answer to this conflict is not
to delineate abstract zones of power. Rather, it is to determine what the
underlying interests are and determine the extent to which they can be
harmonized." Second, it is important to push beyond a posited or even
asserted concept of state interest to examine the actual interests of indi-
viduals and groups as represented by the state. These interests are those
that will actually determine state behavior, and thus allow us to assess
the likelihood of conflict or cooperation on any particular issue.86 The
84. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S.
Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1992) (arguing that the rationale for the re-
newed presumption of territoriality is obsolete and thus should be abandoned as it
constrains the United States in the extraterritorial application of its laws); Kramer,
supra note 56 (arguing that the Aramco decision was wrongly decided and that a
federal choice of law system is necessary).
85. Cf Kramer, supra note 56, at 211-12 (arguing that conflict of laws should
not be based on territory or where the conduct occurred, when that country or state
has no legitimate interest in applying its laws). Professor Kramer thus calls for the
elimination of "false conflicts." Id.
86. See supra notes 43-48 (discussing assumptions which are crucial to a Liberal
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following paragraphs spell out a five-step test designed to maximize the
potential for substantive regulation while minimizing the prospect of
inter-state conflict by assessing and taking account of the true configura-
tion of state interests.
1) Step One
The rule of reason attempts to measure the magnitude and intensity of
a constructed state interest based on contact with territory, or else the
"importance of the regulation to the regulating state." Alternatively,
the state itself can assert its interest directly by way of a diplomatic
transmission or an amicus brief. From a Liberal perspective, however,
the real measure of a "state" interest is the interest of whatever segment
of society the state represents. Interest, defined in this manner, cannot
be measured by contacts with territory per se. Moreover, interests cannot
be defined by what a state claims in the context of a particular case, as
state institutions have little to lose by identifying their interest with that
of the individual litigant.
The most effective manner by which to establish whether the United
States has an interest in asserting jurisdiction is to determine whether it
has a substantive interest in regulating the conduct in question. This test
is met by determining whether the suit states a claim on which relief
may be granted under federal law.? If the plaintiff passes this test she
will have demonstrated a U.S. interest in the subject of the suit. The fit
between the law and the complaint testifies to an interest asserted and
confirmed by a legislative process open to influence by a wide range of
political, economic and social groups. Step one should thus be a thresh-
old determination of subject matter jurisdiction, as distinct from the
issue of legislative jurisdiction. This is the analytical division that Justice
Scalia recommends in Harford Fire?
outlook on transnational affairs).
87. See Born, supra note 84, at 34-35 (addressing the use of international law
and principles of comity to establish an adequate test for the extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States laws to foreign conduct).
88. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (discussing essential assuxnp-
tions of a Liberal perspective on transnational relations).
89. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
90. Justice Scalia argues that courts will be more inclined to interpret a statute
restrictively if their interpretation is not connected to the question whether they have
power over the case in the first place. Whether or not a restrictive interpretation is
desirable, threshold considerations of judicial power should not distort the process of
statutory interpretation. See Hartford Fire, 113 S.Ct. at 2920 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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2) Step Two
The second step is the legislative jurisdiction analysis. The first ques-
tion here, accepting that the United States government does have a sub-
stantive interest in regulating this kind or type of conduct, is how far its
interest extends. Presumably, for instance, no matter how committed
Congress may be to fighting restraints of trade, it would not concern
itself with a German monopoly on goods sold exclusively in Korea. The
result of viewing the state as the agent of some or all individuals and
groups in society is that the state's interests will vary to the extent that
those individuals are affected. They are likely to be affected by each
other's behavior, by behavior that takes place in the territory in which
they live and by behavior that has an impact on the territory in which
they live. The state's substantive interest, evidenced by the demonstra-
tion that the case raises a question under existing substantive law, can
thus be limited by the principles of nationality, territoriality, and some
version of the effects doctrine. These principles have simply been recast
from statements of a priori sovereign power to statements about the
scope of sovereign interests as a function of the interests of the individ-
uals and groups that the sovereign represents.9
3) Step Three
Having established the interest of the forum government, the court
must now assess the interest of the foreign government. As suggested,
reliance on a foreign sovereign's claim of interest in a specific case may
reflect nothing more than an individual litigant's ability to pressure the
Foreign Office, a relatively costless benefit a government can provide to
its citizens on a case by case basis. Applying the Liberal model, friction
will arise only if there is a conflict with the economic and social inter-
ests that the government actually represents over the long term. Thus the
real question is whether the foreign government has a substantive regu-
(arguing that "comity" refers not to the comity of courts, "whereby judges decline to
exercise jurisdiction," but rather to comity exercised by legislatures when they enact
laws).
91. The link between territoriality, nationality, and effects and the interests of
individuals and groups represented by the government in question, however, is not
automatic. For instance, if one transmits financial data through the U.S. payments
system to Japan, and the claim is made that the United States should assert jurisdic-
tion, the party asserting jurisdiction must show that the fact of transmission gives rise
to a specific regulatory interest other than a generic (and outdated) interest in con-
trolling all activity "in or on" a government's physical territory. Thus a more refined
version of this step of the test would require a demonstration of the asserted link.
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latory interest in the subject at issue and the nature and direction of that
interest.
As with the forum state, the best way to answer this question is to
look to the foreign state's law. That law will reflect the balance of
social, economic and political interests in that society z Looking to the
law ensures that the actual balance of internal interests and the asserted
balance of external interests is the same. Stated in other terms, a gov-
ernment cannot pander to special interests in a specific case involving
the extension of foreign regulatory jurisdiction unless it is equally re-
sponsive to or bound by those interests at home. More generally, as in
the case of the forum state, the existence of a law is the best evidence
of a substantive interest in the subject at hand. Thus the forum court
should apply a version of the federal question test to the foreign law:
does the case present a question arising under the foreign law? If the
answer is yes, then the scope of that interest should similarly be deter-
mined according to the principles of territoriality, nationality or effects.
This was, in fact, the test applied by the majority in Hartford Fire, in
which the Court determined that no conflict existed between the United
States and Britain because Britain did not have a law on point?3 At
first glance, this requirement looks like a simple device to extend the
reach of the U.S. regulatory arm. But a Liberal analysis would conclude
that the full range of British economic, social and political interests nor-
mally represented in the legislative process had not actually reached an
outcome opposed to regulation of the insurance industry. It is possible,
of course, that the British polity does not perceive the existence of a
problem so as to require regulation, or that the British insurance indus-
try has carved out a cozy nook for itself. In either case, however, it is
92. Once again, this view does not assume democratic forms of government lead-
ing to maximum representation, although empirical research within the family of Lib-
eral theory suggests that maximum representation will minimize international conflict
by preventing special interest groups from skewing the interests of society as a whole.
A particular government might represent only a minority of wealthy interests, or a
military elite, or a family or tribal clique. Nevertheless, the procedures established by
those interests for internal law-making will be a better reflection of the government's
actual interest in a particular case than a post-hoc determination by the government
itself. To acknowledge this interest is not necessarily to endorse such a power struc-
ture. Indeed, there may be cases in which the international community deems the
interests that the government represents as illegitimate: consider the case of apartheid.
Within the context of extraterritoriality doctrine itself, however, the goal is not to
achieve international justice, but rather to allow states to assert their legitimate regula-
tory interests with minimum international friction.
93. Hartford Fire, 113 S.Ct. at 2910.
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reasonable to assert that the British government does not have a substan-
tive regulatory interest in the conduct at issue in the case.
4) Step Four
Assuming that there are two laws on point, the forum court now
confronts evidence of overlapping state interests in the subject at hand.
The question now is to determine whether the two laws actually con-
flict. If they do not, then the forum court is free to apply the law of the
forum state, on the assumption that the underlying interests of the indi-
viduals and groups represented by their respective governments are suffi-
ciently harmonized to minimize the prospect of long-term conflict be-
tween these two governments. In the antitrust context consumers and
small business might be perfectly content to allow foreign antitrust regu-
lation to pick up wherever domestic regulation leaves off.
If the two laws do conflict, the forum court should adopt a presump-
tion of comity accompanied by a clear statement rule-refusing to apply
United States law unless Congress delineates precisely the geographical
scope or intended subjects of the law.9" The presence of a relevant but
conflicting foreign law reveals that the economic, social and political
interests of whatever segment of the foreign society is represented are
engaged; a court cannot assume that the relevant interests in this country
would in fact apply the law abroad under those circumstances.
5) Step Five
Subsequently, if Congress responds with a clear statement of intent,
the court must then apply the law and invite conflict with the foreign
government. At this point the court can be sure that an underlying con-
flict of interests exists on the part of the individuals and groups that
each government represents. Moreover, the court can be confident that
both sides are determined to assert their interests even in the face of
potential conflict. Over the long term, however, bringing the conflict to
this kind of a head is likely to invite Executive intervention to reach an
agreement harmonizing the laws in question or establishing mutually
agreed principles for interpretation and application of those laws. If such
an agreement is reached and ratified, it will reflect a change in the
composition of the underlying interests brought about by the fact of the
conflict itself. The uncertainty in the law or the prospect of double
liability, for instance, might lead the businesses subject to antitrust regu-
94. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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lation to approve an agreement accepting the extension of foreign juris-
diction further than they might previously have considered.
To summarize, this proposal combines an initial determination of
substantive government interest-itself based on an application of the
federal question test combined with the traditional principles of national-
ity, territoriality, and effects---with a conflicts approach designed to
ferret out true conflicts.' The practical effect is likely to be closer to a
presumption of extraterritoriality than a presumption of territoriality. In
other words, courts would apply foreign law unless there is evidence of
a direct conflict between two laws regulating the same issue area. The
Aramco clear statement rule97 would be used only in the event of a
determination of such a conflict. Thus, the test is designed to focus
attention on a particular point of conflict with a foreign nation and to
ensure that the interests represented by a particular government do in
fact conflict?5
The test advanced here is considerably simpler and more determinate
than the multi-factor rule of reason test, a test that according to Judge
Easterbrook, invites judges to "throw a heap of factors on the table
and ... slice and dice to taste." The chief ambiguity in the test will
arise in deciding whether or not a foreign law on point does or does not
conflict with the U.S. law, but this should be a relatively familiar task.
It is certainly easy enough to apply to recently decided cases. It
would have led to the contrary result in Aramco, for instance. The court
would have readily determined the existence of a U.S. interest, but
would have been unlikely to find a Saudi law requiring United States
companies to discriminate against United States nationals. The underly-
ing economic, social and political interests, taken as a whole in the two
nations, are easily reconciled.
In Hartford Fire Insurance, on the other hand, this approach would
yield the same result as the actual case, although by a more streamlined
and systematic route. Yet if the British government were now to pass a
95. RESTATEMNT (THIRD), supra note 66, sec. 402. There are yet other princi-
ples, such as passive personality and universal jurisdiction, but they are raised suffi-
ciently infrequently as not to merit attention here.
96. Supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
97. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
98. See id. at 251 (arguing that the clear statement rule is used to ensure that
broadly worded statutory language is not used as proof of the intent to apply the
statute extraterritorially).
99. Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat. 902 F.2d 1275,
1283 (1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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law directly exempting British insurance companies from antitrust regu-
lation, a United States court would necessarily defer to British law un-
less Congress countered in kind. Finally, in Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, this test would have again produced a contrary result, as no
other nation's law nor international law would have conflicted with
congressional efforts to require the Attorney General to comply with
United States obligations under the U.N. protocol on refugees.
Overall, however, the best argument for this test rests on the soundness
of the Liberal model of the international system. The Liberal approach
analyzes extraterritoriality as a regulatory problem rather than a power
problem. The issue is not a clash of power, an exercise of international
judicial or legislative strength, but rather a question of the compatibility
of interests on the part of individuals and groups represented by the two
or more governments involved. The existence of national legislation is
the best indicator of those interests. Although the national legislative
process can certainly be distorted or captured, it is likely to be a more
accurate reflection of the interests that will in fact determine government
behavior than either an unconstrained government assertion of interest in
a single case or a highly discretionary balancing of a wide range of
factors. Further, to the extent that adoption of this approach by national
courts encourages foreign governments to express their disagreements
with the regulatory policies of other nations in legislation, the passage
of such legislation will ensure that a true conflict of underlying interests
exists. The two clearly conflicting laws will also help crystallize the
dispute beyond normal diplomatic wrangling, such that progress is more
likely to be made at the international level.
CONCLUSION
International relations theory can illuminate and challenge the assump-
tions about the international system that international lawyers conscious-
ly or unconsciously rely on to shape their mental map of the interna-
tional system. Moreover, it facilitates assessments of the efficacy of
particular legal rules. Liberal international relations theory creates analyt-
ical space for both individuals and groups operating in domestic and
transnational society and states, and conceptualizes them in relation to
one another. The operationalization of these assumptions in international
law elevates the significance of transnational and national law, as well
as international norms enforced by domestic courts.
More specifically, a Liberal analysis of extraterritoriality doctrine
as shaped and applied by the U.S. Supreme Court - sets up a dichoto-
my between conceptions of territorial power and the underlying interests
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of the individuals and groups represented by the governments involved.
A focus on these interests leads to an emphasis on their expression in
national legislation, and concludes that as long as the forum government
has a legitimate substantive interest in the subject to be regulated on
behalf of whatever subset of individuals and groups it represents, then a
court should apply forum law unless it directly conflicts with foreign
law. In the event of such a conflict, the forum court should apply a
clear statement rule designed to ensure that the forum legislature is
willing to brook this conflict for the sake of extending the regulation at
stake.
In many ways, then, a Liberal analysis collapses extraterritoriality
doctrine into conflicts analysis. Indeed, Larry Kramer's analysis of
Aramco from a conflicts perspective urged a similar approach of rooting
out false conflicts."w This essay, however, is not the place to explore
the similarities and differences between Liberal international relations
theory and conflicts of law. To the extent, however, that the influence
of Liberal theory is to push international economic law in the direction
of a transnational judicial-legislative dialogue about common regulatory
problems and solutions, it reinforces existing trends. As David Kennedy
argues in his contribution to this volume, the emergence of international
economic law has been pushed by a "double movement.., from public
to private [law] and beyond the sovereign forms which mark the distinc-
tion between public and private."'0 ' Liberal international relations the-
ory provides the political science foundation for that movement, and a
view of the world to match.
100. See Kramer, supra note 56.
101. Kennedy, supra note 13, at 63.
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